Laura Kennedy in an opinion piece for the Irish Times, “A thought experiment to tease out religious attitudes to abortion,” believes that the notion that life begins at conception “originates in and is inextricable from religious ideology” (Irish Times, 22 August 2016). In the majority of instances the justification of a pro-life attitude, she writes, “lies in religious thinking.”
A few years ago, Desmond M. Clarke, emeritus professor of philosophy at UCC wrote an article for the Irish Times, entitled “Moral certainty is not sufficient to shape legislation,” (Irish Times, 27 May 2013). In a similar vein to Kennedy, he wrote: “The history of religions shows that sects have held the most irrational and misogynistic beliefs, and have attributed them to a god.”
Science tells us that at the moment of conception there comes into being a unique organism with its own intrinsic ability for self-development. Genetics provides the basis for affirming that conception and the coming into being of a human being occur at exactly the same time.
According to Kennedy, however, those who accept the findings of science with regard to the beginnings of human life are bound by “religious ideology.” In the space of three sentences Clarke mentions Catholics, the idea that “No one can argue with faith,” and sects who have held “the most irrational” beliefs. It’s difficult not to connect the dots.
In what follows, let’s examine a key common supposition that unites the articles penned by these two philosophers – a supposition that underpins, albeit unconsciously, much pro-choice thinking. It will become apparent that the two philosophers I have referred to have reached their conclusions by ignoring the fact that we do in fact have bodies and without taking into consideration the demands of contemporary science.
Clarke writes that there are “familiar reasons” for rejecting the idea that “every human life is that of a person from the moment of conception.” In his view it is therefore not possible to ascribe the rights and moral entitlements of persons to “human life from conception.”
Just exactly when we can begin to ascribe the rights and entitlements of persons to human beings is not clear from this formulation of the point. Clarke’s philosophical presuppositions do not allow – nor can they allow – any clarity.
Clarke, in his article, explicitly quotes Locke. His views on personhood, moreover, reflect the latter’s philosophy of human consciousness. Clarke of course does not indicate that there are in fact serious objections to a Lockean understanding of consciousness.
One fundamental difficulty with the application of this view of consciousness to questions of human personhood is that it requires us to pretend that our bodies are not part of who we are as persons. Personhood, we are led to believe, is simply based on consciousness.
A range of other philosophers argue otherwise based on the understanding that we are not only our minds and that we are not only our bodies. We are a unity of both. The analytic philosopher, Lawrence A. Shapiro, ably demonstrates the intimate relationship between body and soul in his book The Mind Incarnate. In this regard he draws upon a variety of sources such as neuroscience, evolutionary theory, and embodied cognition.
If we accept that our bodies – whatever their stage of development – are part of who we are as human persons, then we have absolutely no grounds to exclude any human being from the circle of human persons. From the point of conception every human being is a person.
We are therefore morally compelled to attribute rights and moral entitlements to human life from conception onwards. The logic of human rights demands that there cannot be an elite group of people dictating who else will or will not be afforded the status of human persons.
Clearly, the fact that human personhood begins at conception is forced on us not by religion but by philosophical reason, supported by contemporary science, with all due respect to Kennedy and Clarke.
The reasons I have offered do not rely on faith. They rely rather on science and on philosophical reason. The debate about abortion is absolutely not one about religion. Much less is it about Catholic faith – although it is interesting to ask why it seems that Catholics tend to be more open to the demands of science and to the rigours of philosophical reason when it comes to the issue of when one becomes a human person.
Kennedy is correct that thought experiments are very useful in clarifying issues. Conceptual clarity is however worth its weight in gold. I suggest that secular philosophers who have espoused the pro-choice cause could do no better than to knock humbly at the door of their Catholic confreres in this regard.
About the Author: Fr Kevin O’Reilly OP
Fr Kevin O’Reilly OP, formerly taught at the Milltown Institute, Dublin, and holds doctorates in both philosophy and theology. In the forthcoming academic year he will teach moral theology at the Angelicum University, Rome.